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A GLANCE INTO RENEGOTIATION
By THEIA A. GEBBIE

Between February, 1919, and April 28,
1942, there were about 170 bills and reso
lutions introduced into Congress designed
to reduce or eliminate profits on war pro
duction.
Following the United States’ entrance
into World War II on December 8, 1941,
the procurement of war materials expanded
rapidly. Many manufacturers were urged
to undertake the manufacture of articles
never produced before and subject to fre
quent change. Others undertook articles
new to them, or increased production to
amounts far beyond their previous small
quantities.

(4) manpower problems. It was practically
impossible to forecast costs so that reason
able profits might be estimated.
Since most early war contract prices had
their origin in small quantity production,
the great increases in the volume of pro
duction and the rapid improvements in
methods frequently brought profits far
beyond those anticipated when contracts
were originally made, and left many con
tractors with profits which they should
not and did not wish to retain.
The cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts were
widely used in the beginning, but even
then it was believed that any flat profit
limitation tended to promote inefficiency,
was a stumbling block in the procurement
program, and was sadly inequitable.
Renegotiation Becomes Law
The enactment of the renegotiation law
as Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental
National Defense Appropriation Act of
1942 was finally the result of certain sug
gestions and proposals made by the pro
curement services of the armed forces. This
was effective as of April 28, 1942.

The demands of war reflected through
(1) revisions of specifications, (2) changes
in quantities and rates of delivery, (3)
shortages of materials and equipment, and

Later Revisions
During 1943 the renegotiation law and
its administration were examined by Con
gress. Four Congressional committees held

Forerunners of Renegotiation
The basis for most of the thinking on
wartime profit control was the recognition
that the people of this country were deter
mined to prevent excessive profits in
World War II. War profits always arouse
public ire. The recollection of experiences
during and after World War I convinced
industry that if some businesses were al
lowed to make undue profits from war, all
industry suffered.
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the Treasury, the Maritime Commission or
the War Shipping Administration, the Re
construction Finance Corporation, and the
War Production Board.

public hearings and in executive sessions
examined carefully many renegotiation
cases, particularly the cases of those who
complained about the administration of
the law.
As a result of these studies, a revision
of the renegotiation legislation was initi
ated by the Committee on Ways and
Means, of the House of Representatives, in
September, 1943. and further considered
by the Finance Committee of the Senate.
This legislation, which was incorporated in
the Revenue Act of 1943, became law on
February 25, 1944. The revision followed
closely the concept and scope of the 1942
law and, in general, strengthened and
clarified the fundamental policies.
There were certain changes, however.
One of the principal revisions was the ex
emption measured by sales volume which
was increased from $100,000 in 1942 to
$500,000 in 1943. While it was known that
excessive profits existed in many smaller
companies, it was recognized that all con
tractors could not be examined and rene
gotiated in a reasonable period. Also, the
amount of excessive profits involved in
these companies was usually not sufficient
to warrant the effort and cost of renego
tiation.
Over-all Method Adopted

The over-all method of renegotiation
was adopted. This procedure permitted the
contractor’s profits on his entire war busi
ness to be examined for a specific fiscal
period in order to reach an agreement for
eliminating excessive profits on all con
tracts and subcontracts as a group and for
that period. In this way, contractors might
offset their losses on certain contracts
against profits on other contracts during
the same period.
The over-all method also reduced the
administrative burden and saved time for
the contractors and the Government. The
use of the fiscal period for renegotiation
facilitated the use of the regular financial
and accounting material of contractors.

The Board may, in its discretion, review
any determination made by any officer or
agency to which its powers have been dele
gated, and has the authority to make a
redetermination of the amount of exces
sive profits. However, where a determina
tion with respect to the amount of exces
sive profits of a contractor or subcontractor
is embodied in an agreement between the
contractor or subcontractor and a duly
authorized representative of the Board,
such agreement is conclusive according to
its terms and shall not be subject to re
view by the Board.
Assignment for Renegotiation

Assignments of contractors are ordinarily
made to the Department or Service be
lieved to have the predominant interest in
the assigned contractor’s renegotiable bus
iness. Some assignments are made, how
ever, by considerations of geographic con
venience and other reasons. For instance,
it has been found advantageous to assign
concerns which produce the same or simi
lar products to the same Department or
Service.

The War Contracts Board may cancel
the assignment of any contractor on the
ground that it clearly appears that no ex
cessive profits were realized by the contrac
tor. However, cancellation of an assignment
does not constitute a formal clearance. If
a contractor desires a clearance of its re
sponsibilities under the Act, renegotiation
must be completed and a clearance issued
in the regular manner.
Determination of
Renegotiable Business

In order to determine whether a con
tractor’s profits received or accrued under
renegotiable contracts and subcontracts are
excessive, it is necessary first to determine
the amount of renegotiable business and
the profits thereon.

War Contracts Board

It is the contractor’s responsibility to
make the segregation of sales and the allo
cation of costs and expenses between re
negotiable and nonrenegotiable business.
However, the segregation and allocation
must be satisfactory to the Department
conducting the renegotiation.

The authority and discretion to adminis
ter the Renegotiation Act of 1943 was con
ferred upon the War Contracts Board with
power of delegation. The Board is com
posed of six members, one each from the
War Department, the Navy Department,
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The Renegotiation Act prescribes what
type of contracts are subject to renegoti
ation. In practice, there often is difficulty
in tracing and identifying all sales with
exactness, especially subcontract sales
where the products are far removed from
the end use. Each contractor must decide
what method will result in the most equi
table segregation of sales.
Often there is more than one method
available for segregating sales between re
negotiable and nonrenegotiable business.
In that event the methods available for
equitably allocating the cost of sales are
carefully considered before a final deter
mination is made as to the method to use
in segregating sales. In general, some such
classifications for segregating sales and allo
cating costs and expenses are:
(1) Industry, customer or customer
group.
(2) Product or group of products.
(3) End use classifications as shown
on reports to the War Production
Board.
(4) Division, department or plant,
wherein the extent of renegotiation
can be determined.
(5) Periods of the year, where the per
cent of business subject to renego
tiation varies with the period.
Determination of Excessive Profits
After the profits pertaining to renegoti
able business have been determined, there
must be a determination of the amount, if
any, which is excessive under the Renego
tiation Act.
Under war conditions the Government is
the nation’s principal buyer. Its purchases
are paid for by taxation and borrowing.
The lower the costs of production and the
prices paid directly or indirectly by the
Government, the less will be the financial
burden on the people of the country. Since
prices are composed of costs and profits,
-renegotiation is in effect an over-all repric
ing. Where prices have been so high as to
produce excessive profits, the adjustment
of prices may be accomplished through an
adjustment of the profits included therein.
All the facts applicable to the contrac
tor’s business for the year being renegoti
ated are examined and considered. The
profit considered is that before Federal
taxes on income. There is no formula for
determining excessive profits; it is a matter
14

of judgment. Some of the principles given
consideration are:
(1) The relationship of profit to sales.
It is generally recognized that sales to
the Government under war contracts
should not result in profits as great as
those which might be earned on a similar
volume of peacetime business acquired
in a freely competitive market. Profits
on war business are paid involuntarily
out of taxes by citizens.
(2) The efficiency of the contractor
with regard to the quantity and quality
of production, the reduction of costs and
economical use of materials, facilities,
and manpower.
(3) Corresponding profits in prewar
base years of the contractor and for the
industry. (Generally, the years 19361939 are used as a base period.) The rate
of profit made on peacetime business is
not necessarily a basis for profits to be
made on war contracts, but it is signifi
cant.
(4) The effect of volume on costs and
profits. In general, the margin of profit
on expanded war sales should be reduced
in reasonable relationship to the ex
panded volume.
(5) The varying characteristics among
several classes of production or between
peacetime and war business; the com
plexity of the manufacturing technique,
and the character and extent of the sub
contracting.
(6) The amount and source of public
and private capital employed and the
net worth. This concerns the proportion
of the plant or equipment or materials
supplied by Government agencies or
other contractors, and the amount of
facilities covered by certificates of neces
sity. Where a large part of the capital
or facilities is furnished, the contrac
tor’s contribution tends to become more
of management only.
(7) The risk incident to reasonable
pricing policies. The contractor who
overprices has taken little responsibility
for increases in cost of materials and
wages, guaranties of quality and per
formance of the product, or any such
risk.
(8) Contribution to the war effort,
including inventive and developmental
contribution and cooperation with the
Government and other contractors in
supplying technical assistance.

fair. There are some non-cooperative con
tractors, and there are some contractors
who consider the treatment they have re
ceived under renegotiation to be unfair.
In such cases a unilateral determination
may be issued involving subsequent review
by the War Contracts Board and the right
to appeal to the Tax Court.

Elimination of Excessive Profits

When an agreement has been reached
with a contractor for the elimination of
excessive profits as a result of renegotia
tion, such agreement is evidenced by the
execution of a renegotiation agreement.
In most instances the contractor has been
assessed Federal income and excess profits
taxes on the profits to be eliminated, and
a credit equal to the amount of such taxes
is allowed against the refund to be made
by the contractor. This refund may be
made by the contractor in a single payment
or in installments as the agreement may
provide.

In the main, however, renegotiation is
accepted as an expedient—an attempt to
correct some of the difficulties in relation
to excessive earnings from war. Until com
petitive conditions are again established,
renegotiation is somewhat of a leveling
agent and accepted by some contractors
as such.

Discussion

Renegotiation has not tried to determine
what are fair and accurate costs. The
underlying thought and approach to rene
gotiation concerns the elimination of ex
cessive and inordinate profits.

The surface view of renegotiation pic
tured above deals primarily with the co
operative contractors, those who realize
that the motivating idea is ethical and

PRONOUNCE IT CORRECTLY
By JENNIE M. PALEN, C.P.A.
Accounting, like all learned professions,
has a technical vocabulary. All good ac
countants know this vocabulary and the
nuances of its meanings. Astonishingly
enough, however, some of the top-grade
accountants do not pronounce some of
these words correctly.
As an example let us take the word
amortize, a word which every accountant
uses over and over again. Dictionaries agree
that the accent is on the second syllable.
Yet in accounting offices and even on the
floor and platform of accounting society
meetings one hears it constantly pro
nounced with the accent on the first syl
lable. The related noun amortization is
properly pronounced a-mor" ti-za' tion,
with the primary accent on the fourth
syllable and the secondary accent on the
second syllable, but we seldom hear it that
way. We hear, instead, am” or-ti-za' tion,
with the secondary accent incorrectly
placed on the first syllable.
Then there is the word used in describ
ing that part of the accountant’s report
which details its contents. The word is
presentation and the e in the first syllable
is short; thus, prez” en-ta' tion. But do
most of us pronounce it that way? We do
not! Ninety-nine percent of us say
pree” zen-ta' tion! We are not, of course,

alone in this error. Many an award pre
sented at distinguished affairs is described
by the presiding officer and by the radio
commentators who subsequently report the
affair as a pree” zen-taf tion. So far no dic
tionary has given this pronunciation the
accolade of its approval.
The words comparable and comparably
do yeoman service for the accounting pro
fession. A high ranking government official
recently pronounced these words compar' a-ble and com-par' a-bly in an able
speech which was eagerly listened to by
accountants. Webster says com' par-a-ble
and com' par-a-bly. Many accountants are
guilty of mispronouncing both.
There is also the word finance. The ac
cent is on the second syllable. But far, far
too often do we hear it pronounced
fye' nance. At an important public dinner
held recently a minister, one of the prin
cipal speakers, was guilty of this error. Let
us not be smug about that, however. Min
isters are not expected to know as much
about finance as we.
Ministers also have been known to trip,
along with some of us, on the word
resources, but this word, too, is one of the
tools of our profession and WE should
know that the accent is on the second
syllable, not on the first.
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